打击利用 AI 的「虚假门面」行动

在过去两年半里，我们报道了威胁行为者试图利用我们的模型实施网络攻击、秘密影响力行动（IO）、诈骗以及其他违反《使用政策》的行为。我们发布这些报告，是为了让监管机构、业内同行和更广泛的社会了解我们所观察到的威胁行为者试图利用人工智能的方式，并揭示他们试图利用的漏洞。Over the past two and a half years, we’ve reported on many of the ways in which threat actors tried to use our models to conduct cyber attacks, covert influence operations (IO), scams, and other violations of our Usage Policies. We publish these reports to inform regulators, our industry peers, and wider society of how we see threat actors trying to leverage AI, and to shine a light on the vulnerabilities they try to exploit.

我们最近封禁了两项影响行动（IO）——一项来自俄罗斯，另一项来自伊朗。这些行动将我们的模型与更传统的技术和手段结合起来，为复杂的“虚假门面”实体提供支持。它们利用这些实体，将地缘政治和冲突相关的信息洗白后，传播给目标受众。伊朗的行动拥有一套由七个“记者”人设组成的班底，用来向世界各地的中小型在线媒体投稿长篇文章；俄罗斯的行动似乎则拉拢了拉丁美洲一些不知情的人，在当地运营一个“智库”。We recently banned two IO—one from Russia and one from Iran—that used our models in combination with more traditional techniques and technologies to support sophisticated “false front” entities. They used those entities to launder geopolitical, conflict-related messaging into their target audiences. The Iranian operation included a stable of seven “journalist” personas which it used to pitch long-form articles to small and medium online outlets around the world; the Russian operation appears to have co-opted unwitting people in Latin America to run a “think tank” on the ground.

这两项行动都涉及多个维度，尝试运用各种不同策略来实现目标。除了撰写长篇文章外，伊朗行动还批量生成社交媒体评论，内容通常与美伊战争有关。俄罗斯行动除了控制这个“智库”，还制作了伪造的“泄露”文件和音频脚本，其中一些被我们发现已在网上传播。两项行动都大量使用人工智能来起草内部报告（俄罗斯行动尤其如此）；在这两种情况下，相关人员都采用了存疑甚至公然欺骗的手段，夸大行动的成效。Both operations were multi-dimensional, trying a range of different tactics to achieve their goals. As well as long-form articles, the Iranian operation generated batches of social media comments, generally on topics related to the US-Iran war. As well as controlling the “think tank,” the Russian operation created fake “leaked” documents and audio scripts, some of which we identified being spread online. Both operations also made heavy use of AI to draft internal reports (the Russian operation did this more than anything else); in both cases, the actors used questionable or outright deceitful methodologies to exaggerate the operators’ effectiveness.

这些行动最引人注目之处在于，它们与人工智能时代之前复杂的影响力行动十分相似，只是借助人工智能让部分工作流程变得更轻松。伊朗行动操控的记者人设，与假记者“艾丽丝·多诺万”（在新窗口中打开）颇为相似。艾丽丝·多诺万是俄罗斯军事情报部门的掩护人物，她的文章曾于2016至2017年间在多家西方媒体发表。2020年，与俄罗斯互联网研究局过往活动有关联的人士运营了一个名为“PeaceData”（在新窗口中打开）的假“新闻”媒体，诱使世界各地毫不知情的记者为其撰稿。What is most striking about these operations is that they closely resembled complex influence operations of the pre-AI age, but used AI to make some of the workflows easier. The journalist personas run by the Iranian operation bore a family resemblance to the fake journalist “Alice⁠(opens in a new window) Donovan⁠(opens in a new window),” a front for Russian military intelligence whose articles were published by a range of Western outlets in 2016-17. In 2020, individuals associated with past activity by the Russian Internet Research Agency ran a fake “news” outlet called “PeaceData⁠(opens in a new window),” which co-opted unwitting journalists around the world into writing for it.

这些行动的潜在影响范围也不同寻常。按照 IO 突围量表（在新窗口中打开）⁠——该量表以 1（最低）至 6（最高）对 IO 进行评级——我们会将俄罗斯发起的行动评定为第 5 类。这是我们开始发布报告以来，首次挫败第 5 类行动。伊朗发起的行动则达到第 4 类。两者都成功将其内容（其中并非全部由我们的模型生成）刊载在主流媒体上，而不只是发布在社交媒体上。这与我们过去两年半揭露的 30 起隐蔽影响行动中观察到的模式一致：与依赖虚假的社交媒体传播相比，试图让内容刊载在真正媒体上的行动，往往具有最大的潜在覆盖范围和影响力。These operations were also unusual for their potential reach. Using the IO Breakout Scale⁠(opens in a new window), which rates IO on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest), we would assess the Russia-origin operation as belonging in Category 5. This is the first Category 5 operation we’ve disrupted since we began our reporting. The Iran-origin operation reached Category 4. Both managed to land their content (not all of which was generated from our models) in mainstream media outlets, rather than simply posting it on social media. This is consistent with a pattern we’ve observed across the 30 covert influence operations we’ve exposed in the last two and a half years: the operations which try to land their content in real media outlets, rather than relying on fake social media distribution, tend to have the highest potential reach and impact.

自 2024 年初以来我们曝光的 30 个 IO 的矩阵，按照主要传播方式（社交媒体、运营方网站、外部刊物）以及其在 Breakout Scale 上的得分进行评估。使用了多种传播方式的行动，例如运营网站并在社交媒体上进行推广的行动，归类时依据的是看起来构成该行动核心的传播方式。Matrix of the 30 IO we’ve exposed since early 2024, assessed by primary distribution method (social media, operation-run website, external publications) and score on the Breakout Scale. Operations which used more than one distribution method, such as running a website and promoting it on social media, are classified by the method which appeared to constitute the core of the operation.

人工智能可以使这类伪装行动规模更大、效率更高、语言表达更流畅，编辑能力也更强。行动者可以利用这些优势欺骗毫无戒心的受害者，例如员工或编辑，并将其内容推送给不知幕后操纵者是谁、也不了解其动机的受众。这些行动还表明，威胁行为者会以多么复杂、高明的方式利用虚假身份和实体来达成目标。要在各组织中维持稳固的防御，关键在于了解威胁行为者在这些行动中利用了哪些漏洞，以及这些漏洞如何转化为受众规模和覆盖范围。AI can give such false-front operations greater scale, efficiency, linguistic fluency, and editorial ability. The operators can use these advantages to exploit unsuspecting victims, such as employees or editors, and plant their content in front of audiences who have no idea who was behind it, or what their motivations were. These operations also demonstrate the complexity and sophistication of threat actors’ use of false personas and entities to achieve their goals. Understanding the vulnerabilities that threat actors exploit in these efforts, and how those vulnerabilities can translate into audience and reach, will be essential to maintaining robust defenses across organizations.

但这些虚假前台行动的隐蔽性质，也使它们特别容易受到负责任披露的影响。“Alice Donovan”和“PeaceData”在被曝光后都停止了活动。因此，我们报道这些虚假前台行动的目的，是让进一步的调查和干预更容易开展，同时让这些行动更难继续。But the covert nature of these false-front operations also makes them particularly vulnerable to responsible disclosure. Both “Alice Donovan” and “PeaceData” ceased their activity after they were exposed. That’s why our goal in reporting these false-front operations is to make further research and disruption easier—and make continuing the operations harder.

俄罗斯方面的行为者在整个拉丁美洲开展影响力宣传活动。Russia-origin actors running influence campaigns across Latin America.

我们封禁了一批源自俄罗斯的 ChatGPT 账号。它们利用 ChatGPT 执行了多种与秘密影响行动相关的任务，目标涉及拉丁美洲多个国家。这些活动大多似乎旨在损害乌克兰在该地区的声誉，但其中一些似乎意在影响当地政治走向，尤其是在阿根廷和玻利维亚。大多数操作者使用俄语发出提示词；其中一人使用西班牙语，但其所在地似乎仍在俄罗斯。我们已将此案相关信息分享给有关部门。We banned a cluster of ChatGPT accounts that originated in Russia. They used ChatGPT for a range of tasks associated with covert influence operations targeting countries across Latin America. Much of this activity appeared aimed at undermining Ukraine’s reputation in the region, but some appeared aimed at influencing local political outcomes, especially in Argentina and Bolivia. Most of the operators prompted in Russian; one prompted in Spanish, but nevertheless appeared to be located in Russia. We have shared information on this case with the relevant authorities.

这些行动者使用 ChatGPT 执行了三项主要任务：撰写有关自身活动的内部报告（以及有关他人活动、而他们有可能冒领功劳的报告），为其行动创作内容，以及起草有关一个位于拉丁美洲、自称为“研究平台”的机构——社会研究中心（SRC）表现情况的报告。他们似乎通过一个名为“Mia Clark”的虚假身份控制了 SRC；为纪念这个名字，我们将这项行动称为“暗黑克拉克”（Dark Clark）。由于我们不允许俄罗斯用户访问我们的模型，他们便使用 VPN 连接我们的服务。The operators used ChatGPT to perform three main tasks: writing internal reports on their activities (and other people’s activities which they could plausibly take credit for), creating content for their operations, and drafting reports on the performance of a self-described “research platform” in Latin America called the Social Research Center (SRC). They appear to have controlled the SRC via a fake persona named “Mia Clark”; in honor of the name, we have nicknamed this operation “Dark Clark.” Since we do not allow access to our models from Russia, they used VPNs to connect to our services.

在他们的内部报告中，操作者声称曾在整个拉丁美洲散布虚假故事，以削弱乌克兰或当地领导人的影响力。一些开源（在新窗口中打开）研究人员（在新窗口中打开）将这些虚假信息归因于一个名为“Politology”或“La Compania”的俄罗斯实体。据报道，该实体是瓦格纳集团及其他由俄罗斯寡头叶夫根尼·普里戈任创立的组织的继承者。与询问其他任何俄罗斯起源网络相比，操作者要求我们的模型翻译或解释有关“Politology”和瓦格纳的公开报道的次数要多得多。In their internal reports, the operators claimed to have spread fake stories across Latin America to undermine Ukraine or local leaders. Some of these fakes have been attributed by open-source⁠(opens in a new window) researchers⁠(opens in a new window) to a Russian entity known as “Politology” or “La Compania,” a reported successor to the Wagner Group and other entities founded by Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin. The operators also asked our models to translate or explain public reporting about Politology and Wagner, far more than asking about any other Russia-origin networks.

这次行动在两个方面不同寻常。首先，它似乎成功地招募了拉丁美洲的一些人，为 SRC 工作。俄罗斯行动人员关于 SRC 的报告提到了薪酬标准、招聘和解雇等事项上的决策，这表明他们控制着这个实体，而非与其合作。现有证据表明，SRC 在拉丁美洲的员工并不知道自己是在为一个俄罗斯团体工作。与我们近期揭露的另一个与俄罗斯有关联的“智库”不同，SRC 似乎通过其招募的员工制作了大部分原创内容。这是过去两年半来我们瓦解的伪装身份运作中最复杂的一次。This operation was unusual in two ways. First, it appears to have successfully co-opted individuals in Latin America to work for the SRC. The Russian operators’ reports on the SRC referred to decisions over issues such as pay scales, hiring, and firing, suggesting that they controlled the entity, rather than cooperating with it. The available evidence indicates that the SRC’s employees in Latin America were not aware that they were working for a Russian group. Unlike another Russia-linked “think tank” that we recently exposed, the SRC appears to have produced a majority of original content via its co-opted staff. This stands out as the most complex attempt to run a front identity that we’ve disrupted over the past two and a half years.

其次，一些开源证据表明，Dark Clark 制作的假消息传播范围之广，甚至引发了事实核查（在新窗口中打开）和官方否认（在新窗口中打开），这说明其渗透程度超过了我们过去两年挫败的任何影响力行动。该行动声称曾在秘鲁散布的一条假消息，甚至加剧了乌克兰与波兰之间的公众紧张情绪。Second, some open-source evidence suggests that Dark Clark’s fakes spread widely enough to provoke fact checks⁠(opens in a new window) and official denials⁠(opens in a new window), indicating a degree of penetration which goes beyond any of the influence operations we disrupted over the past two years. One fake that the operation claimed to have planted in Peru even fed into public tensions between Ukraine and Poland.

操作者使用 ChatGPT 的主要方式，是起草并更新提交给一位身份不明上级的内部报告。这些定期报告描述了他们在整个拉丁美洲开展秘密影响力行动的努力，涉及三项主要工作：诋毁乌克兰并削弱为乌克兰武装部队招募人员的工作；干涉某些国家的国内政治，尤其是玻利维亚和阿根廷；以及管理 SRC。在大多数情况下，我们没有发现威胁行为者利用我们的模型为这些行动创作内容，他们只是用模型撰写相关报告（少数例外情况见下文）。The main way the operators used ChatGPT was to draft and update internal reports to an unknown superior. These regular reports described efforts to conduct covert influence campaigns across Latin America. They encompassed three main workstreams: efforts to denigrate Ukraine and undermine recruitment for the Ukrainian Armed Forces; efforts to interfere in the domestic politics of certain countries, especially Bolivia and Argentina; and management of the SRC. In the majority of cases, we did not observe the threat actors using our models to create content for the campaigns, only to report on them (the few exceptions are described below⁠).

这些报告包含丰富的战术细节，揭示了这项行动如何企图削弱乌克兰以及一些国家领导人的地位，尤其是阿根廷、玻利维亚和厄瓜多尔的总统。部分报告描述了诱骗当地人开展某些活动的努力，行动人员可以利用这些活动作为武器；其他报告则提到行动人员声称自己散布过的虚假“泄密信息”。The reports were rich in tactical detail, shining a light on how the operation sought to undermine Ukraine and some national leaders, notably the presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Some described efforts to trick locals into carrying out activities that the operators could weaponize; others described fake “leaks” that the operators claimed to have spread.

在两个案例中，证据将这些操作者与有关“Politology”的公开报道联系起来。操作者称，他们在 2024 年开展了两场针对阿根廷总统哈维尔·米莱的行动。首先，他们称自己散布了一则假消息，声称米莱为他的狗买了卡地亚镶宝石项圈。其次，他们声称自己付钱给当地人士，让他们在布宜诺斯艾利斯张贴反米莱涂鸦。根据泄露的文件，这两项说法均已被公开⁠（在新窗口中打开）归因⁠（在新窗口中打开）于“Politology”和“La Compania”。In two cases, the evidence ties the operators to public reporting on “Politology.” The operators reported that, in 2024, they ran two campaigns targeting Argentina’s President Javier Milei. First, they said they spread a false report that Milei had bought Cartier jeweled collars for his dogs. Second, they claimed that they paid local actors to post anti-Milei graffiti in Buenos Aires. Based on leaked documents, both these claims have been publicly⁠(opens in a new window) attributed⁠(opens in a new window) to “Politology” and “La Compania.”

还有许多其他伪造内容此前并未被认定与俄罗斯信息行动有关。例如，操作者声称，他们于2026年5月创建了一个虚假电子邮件地址，冒充来自秘鲁利马地区教育局。他们利用该地址指示该区的学校在全国文化与语言多样性日（5月21日）举办乌克兰主题活动。邮件还明确要求提及一些人物，其中包括颇具争议的20世纪乌克兰民族主义者斯捷潘·班德拉。一些乌克兰人将他视为独立运动人物，但在俄罗斯和波兰，他则与法西斯主义、战时合作及暴行联系在一起。操作者称，一些学校回复了这个虚假电子邮件地址，确认举办了此类活动，甚至还提供了照片。Many more fakes have not been previously tied to Russian IO. For example, the operators claimed that in May 2026, they created a fake email address purporting to come from the Regional Directorate of Education in Lima, Peru. They used this to instruct schools in the district to hold events dedicated to Ukraine on the national Day of Cultural and Linguistic Diversity (May 21). The emails included explicit instructions to reference, among others, controversial twentieth-century Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera, who is seen by some Ukrainians as an independence figure, but associated in Russia and Poland with fascism, wartime collaboration, and atrocities. According to the operators, some schools replied to the fake email address, confirming that they had held such events and even providing pictures.

操盘者随后声称，他们在秘鲁和波兰的媒体上散布了有关这些事件的报道，同时指控乌克兰正在“输出”极端民族主义意识形态，引发了众怒。开源搜索发现，秘鲁⁠（在新窗口中打开）和⁠（在新窗口中打开）波兰⁠（在新窗口中打开）媒体⁠（在新窗口中打开），以及匈牙利一家英文刊物⁠（在新窗口中打开）上都刊有与这一说法相符的报道（其中一些文章后来已被删除）。一些⁠（在新窗口中打开）文章⁠（在新窗口中打开）还引用了一名波兰欧洲议会议员的回应，他提议将表现出“反波兰情绪”的人宣布为在波兰不受欢迎的人物。因此，俄罗斯的这则假消息既利用了乌克兰人与波兰人之间的历史积怨，也加剧了这种积怨。The operators then claimed to have planted stories about the events in the media in both Peru and Poland, alongside allegations that Ukraine was “exporting” ultra-nationalist ideologies, triggering outrage. Open-source searches identified stories that matched this claim in the Peruvian⁠(opens in a new window) and⁠(opens in a new window) Polish⁠(opens in a new window) press⁠(opens in a new window), and an English-language publication in Hungary⁠(opens in a new window) (some of the articles have since been deleted). Some⁠(opens in a new window) articles⁠(opens in a new window) included a reaction from a Polish Member of the European Parliament proposing that people who showed “anti-Polishness” be declared persona non grata in Poland. The Russian fake thus both fed on, and fed into, historical tensions between Ukrainians and Poles.

同样，6月，这些操作者声称，他们使用了另一个虚假的电子邮件地址，诱骗厄瓜多尔的学校举行仪式，宣誓效忠总统丹尼尔·诺沃亚和私营军事承包商黑水公司的前负责人埃里克·普林斯。这些操作者声称，这一事件在厄瓜多尔引发了愤怒，并给政府施加压力，迫使其否认这则假消息，从而将其传播扩大到全国范围。再次，开源研究发现，厄瓜多尔媒体（在新窗口中打开）报道（在新窗口中打开）与这一说法十分相似，甚至还有厄瓜多尔（在新窗口中打开）新闻（在新窗口中打开）媒体刊载了该国教育部长对此作出的详细驳斥。Similarly, in June, the operators claimed they used a different fake email address to trick schools in Ecuador into holding a ceremony pledging allegiance to President Daniel Noboa and to Erik Prince, former head of private military contractor Blackwater. The operators claimed that the incident provoked outrage in Ecuador and put pressure on the government to deny the fake, thus amplifying it to a nationwide audience. Again, open-source research identified media⁠(opens in a new window) coverage⁠(opens in a new window) in the Ecuadorian⁠(opens in a new window) press⁠(opens in a new window) that closely resembled this claim, and even a detailed rebuttal⁠(opens in a new window) by Ecuador’s Minister for Education.

这些操作者采用了多种手段，为他们编造的故事造势。根据其内部报告，3月，他们散布了两条针对厄瓜多尔的不同假消息。其中一条使用了伪造音频，并将其归于乌克兰驻厄瓜多尔领事；音频中，这位领事被指发表了贬损厄瓜多尔人的言论。我们的开源调查发现，TikTok 上有一条帖子与这一说法完全吻合，但互动似乎有限。另一条假消息则称，在 X 和 TikTok 上流传的一段伪造视频片段，带有一家真实新闻频道的标志，声称诺沃亚政府正在招募年轻男子赴乌克兰作战。厄瓜多尔的事实核查人员⁠在4月初描述了一场与这一说法相符的宣传活动。The operators used a range of techniques to underpin their false stories. According to their internal reporting, they spread two different fakes targeting Ecuador in March. One used fake audio attributed to Ukraine’s consul in Ecuador, in which he was alleged to have made disparaging comments about Ecuadorians. Our open-source investigation identified a post on TikTok which matched this precise claim; it appeared to receive only limited engagement. The other described a fake video clip spread on X and TikTok under the logo of a genuine news channel, alleging that Noboa’s government was recruiting young men to fight in Ukraine. Fact checkers⁠(opens in a new window) in Ecuador described a campaign that matched this description in early April.

2026年4月8日发布的 TikTok 视频，使用了本次行动伪造并声称来自乌克兰领事的音频。TikTok video posted on April 8, 2026, with the faked audio claimed by this operation and attributed to the Ukrainian Consul.

另一份内部报告描述了他们在五月底、反政府抗议达到高潮之际于玻利维亚散布的一则假消息。操作者明确表示，这场行动的目的是加剧抗议活动引发的危机。行动中出现了一段伪造的录音，录音里一名国营供水公司 EPSAS 的员工声称，政府将切断行政首都拉巴斯的供水，并宣布进入紧急状态。我们的开源调查发现，有人已对这一说法进行了辟谣，EPSAS 也发布了官方否认声明。Another internal report described a fake they spread in Bolivia in late May, at the height of anti-government protests. The operators described the goal of this campaign explicitly as to exacerbate the crisis around the protests. The campaign featured a fake audio recording of a worker at the state water company, EPSAS, saying that the government was going to shut off water to the administrative capital, La Paz, and declare a state of emergency. Our open-source research identified a debunk⁠(opens in a new window) of the matching claim and an official denial⁠(opens in a new window) from EPSAS.

其他内部报告还提到了一些我们无法通过公开来源证实的假消息，可能是因为这些内容已被删除，或未能传播开来。例如，操作者声称，他们在1月传播过一则消息，称一名巴西网红兼模特被乌克兰使馆代表贩运至乌克兰，并在基辅遭杀害。6月，他们声称又在玻利维亚传播了一段伪造的音频，这次音频假称来自玻利维亚中央银行的一名员工，警告该银行即将限制现金取款。他们还声称传播过一封伪造的该国碳氢化合物管理机构来信，警告将限制向私家车出售燃料。Other internal reports included fakes that we were unable to corroborate from open sources, possibly because they had already been taken down, or failed to spread. For example, the operators claimed to have spread a story in January alleging that a Brazilian influencer and model had been trafficked into Ukraine by representatives of the Ukrainian Embassy, and had been killed in Kyiv. In June, they claimed to have spread another fake audio clip in Bolivia, this time purporting to come from an employee of the Central Bank of Bolivia, warning that the Bank was about to limit cash withdrawals. They also claimed to have spread a faked letter from the country’s hydrocarbons agency, warning of restrictions on fuel sales to private cars.

在其他报告中，操作者要求我们的模型帮助找出目标国家发生的、可以归功于他们的事件，即便他们并未参与其中。例如，在阿根廷，操作者声称，阿根廷外交部长曾在联合国关于福克兰群岛／马尔维纳斯群岛的委员会会议上引用他们的行动。操作者将阿根廷提出的以下论点归功于自己：自决原则不适用于这些岛屿；英国在当地维持的军事存在不成比例。事实上，这两种论点多年来一直是阿根廷官方立场的一部分。类似地，6月，巴西媒体报道了一名巴西公民的案例：他曾前往乌克兰参军，被俄罗斯军队俘获，随后在电视声明中称自己是被骗去参战的。ChatGPT 操作者试图声称，这篇报道复述了他们行动所传递的信息；事实上，报道引用的是这名被俘者本人的视频。这表明，操作者可能是在试图针对自己的雇主开展影响力行动，而非面向任何外部受众。In other reports, the operators asked our models to help identify incidents in the target countries that they could take credit for, even if they had not been involved. For example, in Argentina, the operators claimed that the Argentinian Foreign Minister had quoted their operation in a United Nations committee meeting on the Falkland / Malvinas islands. The operators took credit for seeding the arguments that the principle of self-determination does not apply to the islands, and that the UK maintains a disproportionate military presence there. In fact, both arguments have been part of Argentina’s official position for many⁠(opens in a new window) years⁠(opens in a new window). Similarly, in June, Brazilian media reported⁠(opens in a new window) on the case of a Brazilian citizen who had travelled to Ukraine to join the army, been captured by Russian forces, and then made a televised statement claiming that he had been tricked into fighting. The ChatGPT operators tried to claim that this report reproduced their operation’s messaging; in fact, it quoted the captive’s own video⁠(opens in a new window). This suggests an attempt by the operators to run an influence operation targeting their own employers, rather than any external audience.

一些运营者的报告提到了一个自称为“研究平台”的机构——社会研究中心（俄语：Центр социологических исследований）。根据该中心的网站介绍，它关注拉丁美洲的印度侨民，以及印度与该地区各国之间的关系。Some of the operators’ reports referred to a self-styled “research platform” called the Social Research Center (in Russian, Центр социологических исследований). According to the SRC’s website, it focuses on the Indian diaspora in Latin America, and relations between India and the countries of the region.

内部报告显示，这些操盘者控制着该智库，而不仅仅是与其合作。报告提到了招聘和解雇决策、薪酬标准、人员配置计划以及正在进行的研究项目等内容。至关重要的是，报告还指出，这些操盘者创建了一个名为“Mia Clark”的虚假身份，用来负责这项行动的社交媒体活动，并与拉丁美洲当地员工互动。现有证据表明，这些一线员工并不知道自己是在为一项俄罗斯行动工作，而是出于善意执行研究任务。这种利用不知情的中间人开展行动的做法，与此前另一起同样与普里戈任圈子有关联的俄罗斯行动“PeaceData”极为相似；Meta 于 2020 年揭露了这起行动。The internal reports suggested that the operators controlled the think tank, rather than merely working with it. They referenced, for example, hiring and firing decisions, pay scales, staffing plans, and ongoing research projects. Crucially, they also stated that the operators had created a fake persona, named “Mia Clark,” to run the operation’s social media activity and engage with staff on the ground in Latin America. The available evidence suggests that these on-the-ground employees had no idea that they were working for a Russian operation, and conducted research tasks in good faith. This use of unwitting cutouts strongly resembles the earlier Russian operation also linked to Prigozhin’s world, “PeaceData,” which Meta exposed⁠(opens in a new window) in 2020.

根据俄罗斯运营者的报告判断，他们在拉丁美洲的当地人员采访了该地区各地的专家和评论员，随后依据采访结果撰写研究报告。研究主题既包括对公众如何看待金砖国家的广泛分析，也包括详细比较雅伊尔·博索纳罗与路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦担任总统期间的巴西经济。有时，俄罗斯运营者会在研究项目发表之前撰写进展报告，这表明他们密切参与了内容的制作过程。我们在 SRC 网站上发现了 60 多篇文章，其中绝大多数似乎都是原创内容。这使 Dark Clark 有别于我们最近揭露的一个起源于俄罗斯的行动：该行动同样以智库为掩护，但其内容大多为抄袭；这表明该行动意在建立一个更持久的掩护实体，并在整个拉丁美洲建立人脉。To judge by the Russian operators’ reports, their staff on the ground in Latin America conducted interviews with experts and commentators across the region, and then drafted research papers based on their findings. The topics ranged from a broad analysis of public opinion on the BRICS group, to a detailed comparison of the Brazilian economy under presidents Jair Bolsonaro and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Sometimes, the Russian operators drafted status reports on the research projects before they had been published, indicating close engagement in the production process. We identified well over 60 articles on the SRC website, the great majority of which appeared to be original compositions. This sets Dark Clark apart from the Russia-origin operation we exposed recently, which also ran a think tank as a front, but plagiarized most of its content; it suggests an intention to build a more durable front entity, with contacts throughout Latin America.

为推广 SRC 的工作，俄罗斯运营人员声称，他们曾尝试建立一系列社交媒体账号。据他们的报告，当世界各地不同地区的运营人员尝试访问同一账号时，这项社交媒体活动遇到了问题，导致账号受到限制。开源记录中可以看到相关痕迹：例如，X 上 SRC 主账号的透明度设置显示其所在地为德国（可能是使用 VPN 的结果），但连接是通过俄罗斯联邦 App Store 建立的；而 SRC 的一个 Instagram 账号的透明度设置则显示，管理员所在地为委内瑞拉。我们发现的三个冠以 SRC 名称的 Facebook 账号，关注者数量都不足以触发管理员所在地设置。To promote the SRC’s work, the Russian operators claimed that they had tried to create a network of social media assets. According to their reports, this social media activity ran into problems when operators in different parts of the world tried to access the same accounts, leading to account restrictions. Traces of this can be seen in the open-source record: for example, the transparency settings of the main SRC account on X showed a German location (possibly as a result of VPN use) but a connection via the Russian Federation App Store, while the transparency settings of one of its Instagram accounts showed an admin location in Venezuela. None of the three SRC-branded Facebook accounts that we identified had enough followers to trigger admin location settings.

左侧：与社会研究中心关联的 X 账号。请注意，其透明度设置显示该账号是通过俄罗斯联邦的应用商店关联的。右侧：SRC Instagram 账号；请注意其位置为委内瑞拉。Left, X account linked to the Social Research Center. Note the transparency setting that shows the account connected via the Russian Federation app store. Right, SRC Instagram account: note the Venezuela location.

运营者报告称，他们在 LinkedIn 上遇到了特别棘手的问题：他们表示，自己创建了一个明确造假的账号来代表 SRC，但随后发现很难为这个账号建立人脉网络。据他们报告，解决办法是再创建更多假账号来关注第一个账号，让它看起来更可信。截至 8 月 17 日，一个使用相同 Social Research Center 品牌形象的 LinkedIn 账号有 961 名关注者，并声称员工人数为 200 至 500 人，但只列出了两名员工。The operators reported particular problems on LinkedIn, where they said they created an explicitly fake account to represent SRC, but then struggled to build a network for it. According to their reports, the solution was to create more fake accounts to follow the first one and make it look more convincing. As of August 17, a LinkedIn account with the same Social Research Center branding counted 961 followers and claimed 200-500 staff, but only listed two employees.

有时，除了使用 AI 更新报告外，操作者也会要求我们的模型协助设计和撰写可用于其行动的文本：例如，请模型帮忙确保其伪造内容符合不同国家的口音、词汇和机构行文风格。这部分工作在总体工作量中占比相对较小，或许是因为该行动似乎至少有一名来自拉丁美洲、以西班牙语为母语的人参与，因此对 AI 语言支持的需求较少。Occasionally, as well as using AI to update reports, the operators did ask our model to help design and create texts that they could use in their operations: for example, asking for help in making sure that their fakes used the correct accent, vocabulary, and institutional style for different countries. This was a relatively small proportion of the overall workload, perhaps because the operation appears to have included at least one native Spanish speaker from Latin America, and therefore had less need of AI language support.

例如，有一次，一名讲俄语的操作者请模型用俄语起草一封信，诬陷乌克兰驻巴拿马名誉领事贪腐。随后，讲西班牙语的操作者请模型将这封信翻译成西班牙语，并生成一份配套的音频脚本。一张与信件内容相符的照片，配上与操作者脚本相符的配音，被一个自称新闻媒体的账号发布在 TikTok 上，但使用的是巴拿马 TVN Noticias 的标志（在新窗口中打开）。该 TikTok 频道只有一名关注者，在散布这则假消息后便停止了发布。For example, on one occasion, one of the Russian-speaking operators asked the model to help draft, in Russian, a letter which would implicate Ukraine’s honorary consul to Panama in corruption. The Spanish-speaking operator then asked the model to translate the letter into Spanish, and to generate an audio script to accompany it. A photo that matched the text of the letter, with a voiceover that matched the operator’s script, was posted on TikTok by an account that purported to be a news outlet, but with the logo of Panama’s TVN Noticias⁠(opens in a new window). The TikTok channel only had one follower, and stopped posting after it planted this fake.

展示这封信的 TikTok 帖子，信件正文和配音脚本均由此操作生成。TikTok post showing the letter whose text was generated by this operation, with a voiceover script likewise generated by the operation.

另一次，这名在俄罗斯的西班牙语使用者给模型一份俄语脚本，其中声称诺沃亚侮辱了厄瓜多尔的贫困人口，并要求模型将其翻译成厄瓜多尔西班牙语。第三次是在三月，同一用户要求模型校对一份西班牙语合同草稿，合同双方是一家名为“International Security Solutions FZE”的公司和一名厄瓜多尔个人，内容声称要在乌克兰提供基础设施服务。用户的问题集中在如何改进措辞和版式上，包括询问哪些词语应当加粗。On another occasion, the Spanish-speaking operator in Russia gave the model a Russian-language script that claimed Noboa had insulted poor people in Ecuador, and asked the model to translate it into Ecuadorian Spanish. On a third, in March, the same user asked the model to proofread a draft Spanish-language contract between a company called “International Security Solutions FZE” and an individual in Ecuador, purporting to provide infrastructure services in Ukraine. The user’s questions focused on how to improve the language and layout, including asking which words should be in bold.

用户围绕合同的提示词在措辞敲定后便告结束。然而，开源调查显示，随后一张“合同”图片在社交媒体上流传（在新窗口中打开）。这张图片被用来佐证一种说法：诺沃亚政府曾与一家空壳公司合作，诱骗厄瓜多尔人应征加入乌克兰军队。假消息传播甚广，以至于四月初引发了一次事实核查（在新窗口中打开）：核查人员得出的结论是，这家公司“似乎未登记在厄瓜多尔公司、证券与保险监管局的名册中”。The user’s prompts about the contract finished once the wording was finalized. Open-source research, however, shows that a picture of the “contract” was subsequently circulated on social media⁠(opens in a new window). It was used to bolster the claim that Noboa’s government had worked with a front company to trick Ecuadorians into being recruited into the Ukrainian army. The fake spread widely enough to trigger a fact check⁠(opens in a new window) in early April: the fact checkers concluded that the company “does not appear in the registry of Ecuador’s Superintendency of Companies, Securities, and Insurance”.

这次行动的影响需要格外谨慎地评估。正如上文所述，行动者的主要手法之一，是将与其行动毫无关联的活动归功于自己。因此，不能轻信他们在内部报告中对行动影响所作的自我宣称。同样，他们声称散布过的一些假消息并未出现在开源调查结果中，这可能是因为这些消息通过非公开渠道传播、已被删除，或者实际上根本没有发布。The impact of this operation requires particularly careful assessment. As noted above, one of the operators’ main approaches was to take credit for activity which had nothing to do with their operation. As such, their own claims of impact in their internal reporting cannot be taken at face value. Similarly, some of the fake stories that they claimed to have planted did not show up in open-source research, potentially because they were spread in non-public channels, already taken down, or not actually posted.

不过，开源证据使我们能够证实他们的一些说法。该行动声称散布的一些假消息后来经事实核查人员报道，并被各国政府辟谣，这表明这些消息传播得足够广，因而引发了回应。在其他情况下，我们能够在网上找到与该行动生成的内容高度吻合的内容。最值得注意的是，该行动声称曾诱骗秘鲁一所学校举办一场宣扬班德拉的活动；此事后来在拉丁美洲和欧洲均有报道，似乎还引来至少一位波兰籍欧洲议会议员发表评论。However, open-source evidence allowed us to corroborate some of the claims that they made. Some of the fakes that the operation claimed to have spread were subsequently reported by fact checkers and debunked by governments, suggesting that they had spread widely enough to merit a response. In other cases, we were able to identify content online that closely matched the content generated by this operation. Most notably, the operation’s claim to have tricked a Peruvian school into holding an event that portrayed Bandera was subsequently reported on in both Latin America and Europe, and appears to have led to comment from at least one Polish MEP.

根据 IO 突破规模（在新窗口中打开）的评级标准（IO 评分从 1 分〔最低〕到 6 分〔最高〕），我们评估认为，此次行动属于第 5 类。现有证据表明，该行动促使多个国家的政界人士公开发表评论。这是自我们开始发布报告以来，首次被我们瓦解的第 5 类行动。Using the IO Breakout Scale⁠(opens in a new window), which rates IO on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest), we would assess this operation as belonging in Category 5, with evidence that suggests that it led to public comment by politicians in a number of countries. This is the first Category 5 operation we’ve disrupted since we began our reporting.

一项源自伊朗的行动以虚假署名在网络新闻媒体上投放长篇文章。Iran-origin operation seeding long-form articles under deceptive bylines in online news outlets.

我们封禁了一批源自伊朗的 ChatGPT 账户。他们使用波斯语输入提示词，并生成波斯语和英语内容。这些操作者通过使用 VPN 访问 ChatGPT 来掩饰自己的位置。We banned a cluster of ChatGPT accounts that originated in Iran. They prompted in Persian, and generated content in Persian and English. The actors obscured their location by using VPNs to access ChatGPT.

该行动利用我们的模型来润色长篇文章和编辑选题提案、生成社交媒体评论，以及完善内部报告。操作者使用了七个不同的署名投稿，因此我们将这场行动称为“虚假署名”。长篇文章聚焦于美伊冲突。大多数评论同样围绕这场冲突，少数则涉及美国政治，通常是在冲突的大背景下展开。The operation used our models to refine long-form articles and editorial pitches, generate social media comments, and refine internal reports. The operators used seven different bylines to pitch their articles, so we have dubbed their campaign “Bogus Bylines.” The long-form articles focused on the US-Iran conflict. The majority of the comments likewise dealt with the conflict; a minority dealt with US politics, typically in the wider context of the conflict.

他们主要工作流所产生的明显影响差异很大。我们发现，在全球约十几家网络媒体上，以该行动的署名发表或转载的文章近百篇。这些媒体规模较小至中等，通常聚焦国际事务、地缘政治和中东事件。相比之下，社交媒体评论似乎都未能引发大量点赞、分享或后续回复。事实上，运营人员的内部报告采用了一种具有误导性的算法来衡量其社交媒体影响力，这或许是为了夸大该行动表面上的成效。The apparent impact of their main workstreams varied significantly. We identified almost 100 articles published or syndicated under the operation’s bylines across roughly a dozen online outlets around the world. These were small to medium outlets, generally focused on international affairs, geopolitics, and events in the Middle East. By contrast, none of the social media comments appears to have generated substantial engagement in terms of likes, shares, or further replies. In fact, the operators’ internal reports used a deceptive calculation to measure their social media impact, possibly in an attempt to inflate the operators’ apparent effectiveness.

整体活动似乎符合商业机构开展雇佣型影响力行动的特征，但我们无法确认涉事的具体机构。我们已将此案相关信息分享给有关部门。The overall activity appeared consistent with a commercial actor running a for-hire influence campaign, but we are unable to identify the particular actor involved. We have shared information on this case with the relevant authorities.

这项行动影响最广泛的活动，是让 ChatGPT 审阅并润色有关美伊冲突地缘政治的英文长篇文章。典型的提示词会要求模型根据某个特定网络媒体的投稿标准评估一篇英文稿件，并提出修改建议，以确保稿件符合要求。操作人员批准修改后，会要求模型撰写一封电子邮件，用于向相关网络媒体的编辑推介文章。This operation’s most far-reaching activity consisted of asking ChatGPT to review and refine long-form, English-language articles about the geopolitics of the US-Iran conflict. Typical prompts asked the model to assess an English-language draft against the submission criteria for a specific online outlet, and suggest edits to make sure it complied. Once the operators approved the edits, they asked the model to generate an email that they could use to pitch the article to the editor of the online outlet in question.

这些推介信息使用了七个不同的假署名撰写：Ervin B. Hoskins、Noah Lamington、Sophia Gonzalez、Michael Harrison、Ericka Feusier、Jenny Williams 和 Alice Johnson。根据网上与其中一些文章一同发布的简介，每个人设都自称是西方记者（通常是美国记者，不过 Noah Lamington 人设的简介声称其人在新西兰），报道重点往往是国际政治、中东、人权或冲突。对于其中一个名为“Michael Harrison”的人设，操作者要求模型自行撰写简介。（值得注意的是，今年三月，Meta 挫败了一场伊朗信息行动，该行动中也出现了一个名为“Michael Harrison”的记者人设。）These pitching messages were drafted using seven different fake bylines: Ervin B. Hoskins, Noah Lamington, Sophia Gonzalez, Michael Harrison, Ericka Feusier, Jenny Williams, and Alice Johnson. According to the biographies that were posted online alongside some of these articles, each persona purported to be a Western journalist (usually American, though the Noah Lamington persona’s bio claimed that they were in New Zealand), often with a focus on international politics, the Middle East, human rights, or conflict. For one of the personas, “Michael Harrison,” the operators asked the model to write the bio itself. (Of note, in March Meta disrupted⁠(opens in a new window) an Iranian IO that also featured a “Michael Harrison” journalist persona.)

其中一些人设由多个社交媒体平台上的账号提供支撑。例如，Michael Harrison 这一人设在 Medium、X 和 Facebook 上都有账号。Ervin B. Hoskins 这一人设则在 X、Facebook、Instagram 和 Threads 上都有账号。该人设的个人简介自称是“一名美国自由撰稿人”，但社交媒体的透明度设置显示，这些账号位于伊朗。Some of these personas were backstopped by accounts across a range of social media platforms. The Michael Harrison persona, for example, was backstopped on Medium, X, and Facebook. The Ervin B. Hoskins persona featured accounts on X, Facebook, Instagram, and Threads. This persona’s bio claimed to be “an American freelance writer”, but social media transparency settings located the accounts in Iran.

顶部：Ervin Hoskins 人设的 Instagram 简介。左下：X 账号透明度信息，显示其使用了西亚地区的 Android 应用。右下：Instagram 账号透明度信息，显示其位于伊朗。Meta 于 8 月封禁了该 Instagram 账号。Top, Instagram bio for the Ervin Hoskins persona. Bottom left, X account transparency information, showing the use of the West Asia Android app. Bottom right, Instagram account transparency information, showing location in Iran. Meta banned the Instagram account in August.

通过开源调查手段，我们发现，在十多家不同的刊物上，近100篇文章以其中一名或另一名运营者的署名发表。这些刊物通常关注国际事务、地缘政治以及中东地区的事件，有时持反战或进步主义立场。我们发现的最早一篇文章发表于2025年7月，最新一篇发表于2026年10月。美伊冲突爆发后，文章发表频率大幅增加。Using open-source investigation techniques, we identified almost 100 articles that had been published under one or other of the operators’ bylines, across over a dozen different publications. These publications generally focused on international affairs, geopolitics, and events in the Middle East, sometimes from an antiwar or progressive point of view. The earliest article we identified was published in July 2025, and the latest in October 2026. The frequency of articles greatly increased after the outbreak of the US-Iran conflict.

2025年7月至2026年9月的文章时间线，按作者和主题划分。请注意，2026年3月起有关美伊关系的出版物密度有所增加。Timeline of articles, by author and theme, July 2025—September 2026. Note the density of publications on US-Iran relations from March 2026 onwards.

2026年2月至7月期间，多家网络媒体以与此次行动相关的署名发表的文章标题示例。Sample headlines of articles published under the bylines linked to this operation between February and July 2026 in a range of online outlets.

随后，至少有一些文章通过相关媒体机构的社交媒体账号得到推广，这为伊朗方面的操作者提供了一种潜在途径，使他们能够触达原本无法接触到的受众。At least some of the articles were then promoted by the social media accounts of the outlets in question, giving the Iranian operators a potential way to access audiences that they would not otherwise have reached.

除了文章之外，威胁行为者还要求 ChatGPT 批量生成关于地缘政治或政治话题的英文或波斯语评论。他们通常会输入社交媒体帖文的文本或截图，并要求模型生成一组符合其总体关注方向的回复。随后，这些回复会被发布到网上，而且往往在几分钟内接连发布。运营人员的内部报告提到了人工和自动化发布；我们没有证据表明，这种自动化是借助我们的模型实现的。Alongside the articles, the threat actors asked ChatGPT to generate batches of comments on geopolitical or political topics in English or Persian. The actors’ typical approach was to input the text or a screenshot of a social media post, and ask the model for a set of replies that aligned with their overall focus. These were then posted online, often within a few minutes of each other. The operators’ internal reporting referred to both human and automated posting; we have no evidence to suggest that this automation was carried out with the help of our models.

左侧是英文推文，右侧是波斯语推文，均由此次行动生成并于7月发布。英文评论回复的是一条英文推文，该推文警告称美国正准备对伊朗发动一场“大规模袭击”。图中所有评论都发布于10分钟内。波斯语评论回复的是一条有关美国袭击伊朗的波斯语推文，并在13分钟内发布。Tweets in English, left, and Persian, right, generated by this operation and posted in July. The English-language comments replied to an English-language tweet warning that the US was preparing a “large scale assault” on Iran. All the comments in this image were posted in a 10-minute span. The Persian-language comments replied to a Persian-language tweet about US strikes on Iran, and were posted within 13 minutes.

这类批量评论活动中，有一部分是针对该行动自身新闻文章的社交媒体帖子生成回复。操作者会输入推广这些文章的帖子截图，然后生成赞扬或支持这些文章的评论，这可能是为了让文章看起来更受欢迎。Some of this batch commenting activity consisted of generating replies to social media posts about the operation’s own news articles. Here, the operators input screenshots of posts that promoted their articles, and then generated comments that praised or endorsed them, likely to make the articles look more popular.

由该行动生成的文章被美国当地新闻主页分享到 Facebook 帖子中，该行动还生成了该帖子的评论。Facebook post by a local US news Page sharing an article generated by the operation, and comments on that post generated by the operation.

大多数评论批次更广泛地聚焦于伊朗、美国和以色列之间的冲突。用户要求针对导弹袭击、停火和外交斡旋等话题撰写评论，并指定要将美国描绘成侵略者、将以色列描绘成不可靠的美国盟友、将伊朗描绘成坚决反抗但坚韧不屈的受害者。操作者针对总部位于英国、批评伊朗政权的卫星电视网络 Iran International 发布的帖子，生成了尤其大量的回复，累计生成了二十多批充满敌意的波斯语回复。少数批次则针对有关美国政治议题的社交媒体帖子生成回复，但通常同样置于这场冲突的大背景之下。The majority of the comment batches focused more generally on the conflict between Iran, the United States, and Israel. The users asked for comments on topics such as missile strikes, ceasefires, and diplomatic maneuvering, specifying outputs that portrayed the US as the aggressor, Israel as an unreliable ally of the US, and Iran as a defiant but resilient victim. The operators generated a particularly large number of replies to posts by UK-based satellite network Iran International—a critic of the Iranian regime—generating over two dozen batches of hostile Persian-language replies. A minority of the batches generated replies to social media posts about US political issues, typically also in the wider context of the conflict.

此操作生成的 Instagram 评论，用于回复有关美国政治的帖子。Instagram comments generated by this operation in reply to posts about US politics.

我们发现，只有少数这类回复被发布到了网上；在我们的开源信息检索中，更多回复并未出现，这可能是因为它们要么没有被发布，要么是由已经被封禁的账号发布的。（例如，三位记者人设——Ericka Feusier、Alice Johnson 和 Jenny Williams——在其公开发布的个人简介中列出了 X 账号用户名；截至 2026 年 8 月，这些账号均已被停用。）一些确实在网上发布评论的账号使用了看起来像西方人的名字，但显示的账号所在地却是伊朗。We identified a small number of these replies being posted online; many more did not appear in our open-source searches, potentially because they were either not posted, or posted by accounts that had already been taken down. (For example, three of the journalist personas—Ericka Feusier, Alice Johnson, and Jenny Williams—listed X account handles in their published bios: all had been suspended as of August 2026.) Some of the accounts that did post comments online had Western-seeming names, but showed account locations in Iran.

上述评论的 Instagram 账户的透明度设置显示，这些账户位于伊朗。The transparency settings of the Instagram accounts that made the comments illustrated above, showing that they were located in Iran.

在我们确实发现这些回复的帖子中，它们通常只占相关帖文全部评论的一小部分，这表明这些运营者并非真实回应中的主导声音。它们似乎也没有获得大量互动：事实上，运营行动所发布回复收到的许多点赞，来自同样与该行动有关联的账号。我们已将此案例的相关信息分享给行业合作伙伴，他们最适合对互动情况进行全面评估。Where we did find these replies being posted, they typically made up a minority of total comments on the post in question, suggesting that the operators were not a dominant voice among the authentic responses. Nor did they appear to have attracted substantial engagement: indeed, many of the likes on the operation’s replies came from accounts that were themselves linked to the operation. We have shared information on this case with industry partners, who are best placed to provide holistic assessments on engagement.

他们试图让自身活动显得更受欢迎，这种做法并不局限于面向公众发布的帖子。在生成内容的同时，操作者偶尔还会让 ChatGPT 润色一些看起来像是其社交媒体宣传活动内部报告的材料。通常，他们会向模型提供一系列统计数据，并要求它将这些数据整理成精美的演示文稿。The attempt to make their activity look more popular was not limited to public-facing posts. Alongside their content generation, the operators occasionally asked ChatGPT to refine what appeared to be internal reports about their social media campaign. This typically consisted of providing the model with a series of statistics, and asking it to turn them into polished presentations.

这并非我们首次挫败利用 AI 撰写自身自我评估（在新窗口中打开）的行动。伊朗操作者试图给自己的作业打分，而其中最引人注目的是他们采用的方法。他们使用的主要“影响力”指标，是他们回复的帖子的浏览量（而非回复本身的浏览量），并比较回复发布前以及发布后一段未明确说明的时间内的浏览量。这种计算方式没有考虑浏览量可能由其他因素带来的情况，例如原帖的受欢迎程度或其他评论。因此，这种方法大幅夸大了行动的影响力数据，表明操作者要么不知道还有更有效的计算方法，要么选择不采用这种方法。This is not the first operation we’ve disrupted that used AI to write its own⁠(opens in a new window) self-review⁠(opens in a new window). What was most striking about the Iranian operators’ efforts to mark their own homework was the method they used to do so. The main “impact” metric they used was the number of views on the posts to which they replied (not the number of views on the actual replies), counted before, and an unspecified amount of time after, the replies were posted. This calculation did not account for any views which may have been the result of other factors, such as the original posts’ popularity or other comments. As such, it greatly exaggerated the operation’s impact figures, suggesting that the operators either did not know a more effective way of calculating them, or did not choose to use it.

事实上，根据从开源观察中能够获取的证据，此次行动的两条主要工作线似乎产生影响的可能性截然不同。In fact, based on the evidence that can be gleaned from open-source observation, the operation’s two main workstreams appear to have had very different degrees of likely impact.

我们能够识别出的社交媒体回复，点赞数、浏览量和评论数普遍较低（个位数或两位数）。如上所述，这些回复通常只占相关帖文全部评论的一小部分。根据 IO 突围量表（在新窗口中打开），该量表以 1（最低）至 6（最高）对 IO 进行评级，我们会将这部分行动评定为第 2 类：多个平台上都有评论，但几乎没有迹象表明其有所突围或有能力主导评论区。The social media replies that we were able to identify generally enjoyed low numbers of likes, views, and comments (in the single or double digits). As noted above, the replies typically made up a minority of total comments on the post in question. Using the IO Breakout Scale⁠(opens in a new window), which rates IO on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest), we would assess this part of the operation at Category 2, with comments on multiple platforms, but little sign of breakout or ability to dominate the replies.

相比之下，记者人设成功让多家媒体刊发了他们的文章，其中一些媒体拥有大量受众：例如，截至 2026 年 8 月，刊发此次行动相关文章的一家线上媒体在 Facebook 上有近 200 万名关注者，在 X 上有近 35.5 万名关注者，在 Instagram 上有超过 54.4 万名关注者。鉴于该行动持续成功突破重围，获得多家媒体刊发，我们将其这一部分评定为第 4 类。By contrast, the journalist personas succeeded in getting their articles published by a range of outlets, some with substantial followings: for example, one of the online outlets that published this operation’s articles had almost 2 million followers on Facebook, almost 355,000 followers on X, and over 544,000 on Instagram as of August 2026. We would assess this part of the operation as a Category 4, based on its consistent breakout to a number of media outlets.